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The Right and Responsibility of a Court to Impose
the Insanity Defense Over the Defendant's
Objection
I. INTRODUCTION
Most defendants charged with serious crimes will assert all
available claims, including the plea "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity,"' to buttress their defense. Occasionally, however, even
in a capital case,2 an accused who has substantial grounds to
claim the insanity defense will not invoke it; instead, the ac-
cused will either admit guilt or deny the charges outright.3
When faced with a defendant who refuses to plead the insanity
defense, a court must decide whether to accept this refusal or
to impose the defense over the defendant's objections.4
1. Insanity is a legal, not a medical, term. The courts consider those who
are found insane under the state's legal test of insanity, see notes 69-70 infra,
not responsible for their criminal acts. See Haines & Ziedler, Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity, in CRimE AND INsANrrY 104, 120 (R. Nice ed. 1958). Thus, a
defendant technically pleads that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. If
successful the defendant is acquitted of the crime, but is also routinely commit-
ted to a mental institution for an indeterminate length of time. See Beran &
Toomey, Integration and Future Developments, in MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS
AND THE CRIuaNAL JusncE SYSTEM 74, 80 (N. Beran & B. Toomey eds. 1979); text
accompanying notes 122-23 infra.
2. In one study, judges and attorneys estimated that the insanity defense
is raised in five percent of all criminal cases. Burton & Steadman, Legal Profes-
sionals' Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 173, 179
(1978). Its use, however, is confined to serious crimes, since the incentive for a
defendant to escape responsibility by arguing the defense is increased in pro-
portion to the severity of the defendant's potential sentence. In fact, except in
capital cases, the defense is infrequently employed. A. MATrHEWS, MENTAL
DisABnr AND THE CRnumNAL LAw 23 (1970). The reason for this is evident: few
defendants are willing to risk indefinite commitment merely for the chance to
evade the penalty for a misdemeanor or a less serious felony. Id. at 56.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 430 F. Supp. 444, 445 (D.D.C. 1977).
In Robertson, the defendant had been convicted of second-degree murder and
assault with intent to kill. After vacillating on the decision of whether to raise
the insanity defense in the second phase of his bifurcated trial, the defendant
chose not to raise the defense. See id. His reasons for making this decision
were "personal" and "quasi-political" in nature, arising from his protest as a
"Black man." Id. at 448. For further discussion of the reasons a defendant
might choose to forego the insanity defense, see text accompanying note 40 in-
fra; notes 93-99 infra and accompanying text.
4. One commentator has recently addressed the question of whether to
impose the insanity defense over the defendant's objection. See Singer, The
Imposition of the Insanity Defense on an Unwilling Defendant, 41 Omo ST. L.J.
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In recent years, this issue has received its most extensive
treatment in the District of Columbia courts.5 Under the tradi-
tional approach, articulated in Whalem v. United States,6 a trial
judge must impose the insanity defense upon defendants-re-
gardless of their well-considered rejection of the defense-if
there is "a sufficient question as to [their] mental responsibil-
ity at the time of the crime."7 Until recently, the District of Co-
lumbia courts followed this approach and refused to defer to a
defendant's decision not to plead this defense even when the
defendant's sanity was strongly in doubt.8
Two recent cases have created some confusion concerning
the continued validity of the traditional Whalem approach. In
Frendak v. United States,9 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, relying upon significant, intervening decisions of the
United States Supreme Court,'0 disagreed with the Whalem ap-
proach and insisted that a trial judge accord absolute deference
to a defendant's "voluntary and intelligent" decision not to
plead the insanity defense." In United States v. Wright,12 how-
637 (1980). For a discussion of the ethical, constitutional, and procedural diffi-
culties confronting a defense attorney when a court imposes the defense on an
unwilling client, see 53 TEx. L. REV. 1065 (1975).
5. The District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction in which the insanity
defense is widely used. Arthur Matthews forwards three explanations for this:
a) There is a better chance of succeeding with it than in other ju-
risdictions.
b) In comparison with other jurisdictions, the dispositional conse-
quences of a successful defense of insanity in the District of Columbia
have seemed to defendants and their counsel to be preferable to those
of a criminal conviction.
c) Certain peculiarities about the civil commitment procedures in
the District appear to have inhibited use of civil hospitalization as a
means of diverting mentally ill persons from the criminal process.
A. MATTM.WS, supra note 2, at 55. Although this Note focuses on opinions from
the District of Columbia, these opinions reflect individual and social concerns
involved in any court's decision to impose the insanity defense over a defend-
ant's objection. Moreover, the three chosen cases present these individual and
social concerns more clearly than do most cases from other jurisdictions. Al-
though many state courts have decided the issue, most have addressed the
question without presenting an analysis of the rationale behind their decisions.
See notes 21-22 infra.
6. 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965).
7. 346 F.2d at 818.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 529 F.2d 871, 876 (1976).
9. 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
10. See notes 28-29 infra and accompanying text.
11. The Frendak court was free to disagree with Whalem because District
of Columbia Circuit Court decisions do not bind the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals. Although decisions of the circuit court were once regarded as pre-
cedent for the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-358, §§ 11-301, -
501, -502, 84 Stat. 473 (1970) (codified in D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-301, -501, -502
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ever, the District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed its deci-
sion in Whalem and rejected the Frendak court's analysis of
two recent Supreme Court decisions.13 Thus, even in the juris-
diction with the most developed case law on the issue, there is
no clear standard for determining whether a court should im-
pose the insanity defense upon an unwilling defendant.
In attempting to eliminate the confusion surrounding this
issue, this Note will first examine Whalem and its reasoning
and then review the conflicting approaches of Frendak and
Wright. After an analysis of the ways in which these ap-
proaches differ, the competing individual and social interests
that these approaches protect will be identified. Finally, this
Note concludes that courts could accommodate these compet-
ing interests more fully by adopting a detailed Frendak ap-
proach for determining whether to impose the insanity defense
upon an unwilling defendant.
II. THE WHALEM APPROACH AND ITS APPLICATION IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A. WHALEM V. UNITED STATES
The District of Columbia Circuit Court stated its traditional
approach to the issue of whether a court should impose the in-
sanity defense over a defendant's objections in Whalem v.
United States.X4 In Whalem, the trial court had declined to im-
(1973)), as interpreted by the court of appeals, granted the court of appeals au-
thority analogous to that possessed by a state supreme court; decisions of a
federal court sitting within its jurisdiction are not controlling precedent. See
MAP. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312-13 (D.C. 1970). See also Bethea v. United
States, 365 A.2d 64, 91 n.54 (D.C. 1971), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
12. 627 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
13. Id. at 1309-13, see notes 27-39, 46-49 infra and accompanying text.
14. 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965). In
Whalem, the defendant faced charges of robbery and attempted rape. The de-
fendant had previously been committed to a mental hospital, and had commit-
ted his alleged crimes while on convalescent leave from the hospital. 346 F.2d
at 814.
On motions by the parties, the trial court ordered two psychiatric examina-
tions of the defendant. The report from one examiner asserted that the defend-
ant was not suffering from a mental disease. The report from the other
examiner diagnosed the defendant as having a "schizophrenic reaction, cata-
tonic type (in remission)," yet denied that the illness had produced his crimi-
nal actions. Id.
There are two subtypes of catatonic schizophrenia. The "excited" subtype
"is marked by excessive and sometimes violent motor activity and excitement
and the ["withdrawn" subtype] by generalized inhibition manifested by stupor,
mutism, negativism, or waxy flexibility. In time, some cases deteriorate to a
vegetative state." COMMri'EE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS OF THE AmERi-
1981]
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pose the insanity defense against the defendant's will. Al-
though the circuit court affirmed this ruling, holding that the
court had not abused its discretion in refusing to impose the
defense,15 it held that "when there is sufficient question as to a
defendant's mental responsibility at the time of the crime, that
issue must become part of the case."1 6
In reaching this conclusion the Whalem court, relying upon
its earlier decision in Overholser v. Lynch,17 emphasized soci-
ety's interest in withholding punishment from those who are
morally blameless. The court stated:
One of the major foundations for the structure of the criminal law is
the concept of responsibility, and the law is clear that one whose acts
would otherwise be criminal has committed no crime at all if because
of incapacity due to age or mental condition he is not responsible for
those acts.1 8
The court, insisting that a trial court must uphold "this struc-
tural foundation"1 9 of the criminal law, reasoned that justice re-
quired the imposition of the unwanted insanity defense upon
the defendant.20 Many state courts have adopted the reasoning
CAN PsYcHIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 33-34 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as DSM-II]. The
Whalem court's opinion does not disclose which subtype afflicted the defend-
ant.
15. 346 F.2d at 818.
16. Id. at 817.
17. 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
In Lynch, the District of Columbia Circuit Court, affirming the trial court's im-
position of the insanity defense over a defendant's objection, stated that the
lower court had "almost a positive duty ... not to impose a criminal sentence
on a mentally ill person." 288 F.2d at 392. The circuit court based its decision
upon three broad interests: society's interest in withholding punishment from
those who are morally blameless, see id. at 393; society's interest in keeping a
criminal committed until he or she is rehabilitated, see id.; and the defendant's
interest in being cured of the illness, see id. at 392. The Whalem court ignored
the second and third interests.
Although Whalem's holding is identical to the Lynch holding, the Whalem
court felt compelled to affirm its conclusion in Lynch because the Supreme
Court had reversed Lynch; the Court ruled that a trial court could not use auto-
matic commitment statutes to hospitalize defendants acquitted by reason of in-
sanity where the court had imposed the defense over the defendant's
objections. See Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See
also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1961), rev'g Overholser v. Lynch,
288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
18. 346 F.2d at 818. The court also noted:
[T] he legal definition of insanity in a criminal case is a codification of
the moral judgment of society as respects a man's criminal responsibil-
ity; and if a man is insane in the eyes of the law, he is blameless in the
eyes of society and is not subject to punishment in the criminal courts.
Id. See generally authorities cited in note 106 infra.
19. 346 F.2d at 818.
20. The court stated: "We believe then that, in the pursuit of justice, a trial
judge must have the discretion to impose an unwanted defense on a defendant
[Vol. 65:927
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of Lynch and Whalem,21 though few have discussed the ration-
ale as thoroughly.22
B. FRENDAK V. UNITED STATES
Frendak v. United States23 was the first District of Colum-
and the consequent additional burden of proof on the government prosecutor."
Id. at 818-19.
21. See, e.g., Les v. Meredith, 193 Colo. 3, 6, 561 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1977); State
v. Fernald, 248 A.2d 754, 760-61 (Me. 1968); Walker v. State, 21 Md. App. 666, 671,
321 A.2d 170, 174 (1974); State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 307-08, 125 N.W.2d 918, 926
(1964); cf. List v. State, 18 Md. App. 578, 587, 308 A.2d 451, 456 (1973) (defense
counsel can enter an insanity plea over the express objections of the defend-
ant); State v. Hermann, 283 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. 1955) (dictum) (evidence of
insanity may be admitted against the defendant's will if his friends or counsel
set up the defense); State v. Gadson, 148 N.J. Super. 457, 463, 372 A.2d 1143, 1146
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (state statute allows a pre-trial investigation into
the defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime). But see State v.
Johnson, 116 Ariz. 561, 563, 570 P.2d 503, 505 (Ct. App. 1977); People v. Gauze, 15
Cal. 3d 709, 717-18, 542 P.2d 1365, 1370, 125 Cal. Rptr. 773, 778 (1975) (en banc)
(relying on People v. Redmond, infra); People v. Redmond, 16 Cal. App. 3d 931,
938, 94 Cal. Rptr. 543, 548 (1971); Hooks v. State, 266 Ind. 678, 682, 366 N.E.2d 645,
647 (1977) (dicta); White v. State, 17 Md. App. 58, 64, 299 A.2d 873, 875 (1973);
State v. Johnston, 84 Wash. 2d 572, 577-78, 527 P.2d 1310, 1313 (1974).
Some courts explicitly cite and follow Whalem as precedent. See, e.g.,
State v. Pautz, 299 Minn. 113, 117, 217 N.W.2d 190, 192 (1974); State v. Smith, 88
Wash. 2d 639, 642-43, 564 P.2d 1154, 1156 (1977) (en banc). See also People v.
Baxter, 32 A.D.2d 840, 844, 302 N.Y.S.2d 456, 461 (1969). Others cite Whalem but
disagree with its conclusion and hold that a court may not impose the defense
upon a defendant who voluntarily and intelligently refuses to raise it. See, e.g.,
People v. Gonzalez, 20 N.Y.2d 289, 294-96, 229 N.E.2d 220, 222-24, 282 N.Y.S.2d 538,
542-44 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 971 (1968).
22. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 21 Md. App. 666, 671, 321 A.2d 170, 174 (1974).
In Walker, the court asserted that a court has discretion to disallow the with-
drawal of a plea of insanity. The court's justification for its holding was given
in two sentences. Id.
23. 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977). In Frendak,
the jury, in the first phase of the District of Columbia's bifurcated trial proce-
dure, found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder in the shooting death of
a co-worker. When the defendant refused to raise the insanity issue in the sec-
ond phase of the trial, the trial court held hearings to determine the strength of
the insanity defense and concluded that the evidence impugning the defend-
ant's sanity was sufficient under the Whalem test to impose the insanity de-
fense over the defendant's objections. On the basis of both the evidence
presented at the hearings and additional testimony presented at trial, the jury
then found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. 408 A.2d at 366-670.
In the District of Columbia, the defendant has the option of a bifurcated
proceeding when sanity is at issue. The first phase of the trial determines
whether the defendant committed the crime; the second phase determines the
defendant's sanity and criminal responsibility. See In re C.W.M., 407 A.2d 617,
621 (D.C. 1979); Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 94-95 (D.C. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
Other states also provide for bifurcated trials when sanity is at issue. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-a,
§ 59 (West Supp. 1980); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02(6) (2) (1980); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.175 (West 1980).
1981]
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bia opinion after Whalem to analyze, in depth, whether a court
should impose the insanity defense over a defendant's objec-
tion. In Frendak, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
overruled the trial judge's decision to impose the insanity de-
fense, holding that a trial court must necessarily defer to a de-
fendant's wishes, regardless of the concerns delineated in
Whalem and Lynch,24 if the defendant "voluntarily and intelli-
gently" rejects the insanity defense.25 The "voluntary" portion
of the Frendak approach requires that the defendant freely
choose-in the absence of illegal coercion-to reject the in-
sanity defense. The "intelligent" portion requires that the de-
fendant be both fully informed of the alternatives available and
able to comprehend the consequences of failing to assert the
defense.26 The Frendak court based its deference to a defend-
ant's voluntary and intelligent rejection-and its general aban-
donment of Whalem 27-upon two recent Supreme Court
decisions: North Carolina v. Alford2B and Faretta v. Califor-
nia.29
Neither Alford nor Faretta involved a defendant's refusal
to plead the insanity defense. In Alford, the Supreme Court
held that a defendant's guilty plea to a lesser offense was made
voluntarily and intelligently despite the defendant's protesta-
tions of innocence. 30 Although the Court affirmed Alford's con-
viction and generally endorsed the notion of deferring to a
defendant's voluntary and intelligent plea,3 ' it reserved the dis-
24. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
25. According to the Frendak court, this absolute deference to the defend-
ant's wish prohibits consideration of the possible strength of the insanity de-
fense. The trial court may focus only on whether "the individual intelligently
and voluntarily decides to forego that defense." 408 A.2d at 367. The Frendak
court, continuing to limit its use of Whalem, held that a trial court may impose
the defense only if the evidence suggests that "the defendant is not capable of
making, and has not made, an intelligent and voluntary decision." Id. at 379.
26. Id. at 380. The three criteria are generally accepted as defining a "vol-
untary and intelligent" decision. See N. FINKEL, THERAPY AND ETHics 103
(1980).
27. The court did not abandon Whalem completely. See note 25 supra.
28. 400 U.S. 25 (1979).
29. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
30. The defendant in Alford, faced with a probable conviction on a first-de-
gree murder charge, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of second-degree mur-
der. 400 U.S. at 27. The trial court did not reject this plea, although the
defendant continued to deny that he had committed the crime. Id. at 28. The
Supreme Court concluded that a defendant "may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is un-
willing or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime."
Id. at 37. In addition, the Court held that "an express admission of guilt" was
not constitutionally required for acceptance of a guilty plea. Id.
31. The Court noted: 'The standard was and remains whether the [guilty]
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cretion of the trial court to reject such pleas in some cases. 32 In
Faretta, the Court held that defendants have a constitutional
right to defend themselves pro se,33 as long as they voluntarily
and intelligently waive their right to counsel.34 The Court also
concluded that a defendant's ignorance of technical legal mate-
rial does not bar the defendant from self-representation--even
if that ignorance results in a poor trial performance 3 -- since a
defendant's lack of legal knowledge does not render his or her
plea decision less voluntary or intelligent.36
In applying Alford and Faretta to the issue of imposing the
insanity defense over a defendant's objection, the Frendak
court emphasized the Supreme Court's deference, in both opin-
ions, to a defendant's choice of defense strategy. The court
noted that the "rationale underlying Alford and Faretta"37 mili-
tated against Whalem's disregard of the defendant's wishes,38
and mandated that trial courts accord the defendant absolute
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
courses of action open to the defendant." Id. at 31. For prior decisions endors-
ing this traditional standard, see note 87 infra.
32. The Court stated:
Our holding does not mean that a trial judge must accept every
constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes to
so plead. A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under
the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court ... al-
though the States may by statute or otherwise confer such a right.
400 U.S. at 38 n.11.
33. 422 U.S. at 836. The defendant in Faretta had requested that the trial
court allow him to defend himself since "he believed that the [public de-
fender's] office was 'very loaded down with ... a heavy case load."' Id. at 807.
After initially acceding to the defendant's wishes, the trial judge denied the re-
quest, ruling frst, that the defendant had no constitutional right to self-repre-
sentation, and second, that he had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver
of his right to counsel. Id. at 808-10. The Supreme Court denied it had reached
a novel result in establishing the right to represent oneself pro se. Id. at 812-34.
34. Id. at 835.
35. The dissent in Faretta argued strongly that the defendant should not
be allowed to make such a potentially disadvantageous decision. See id. at 838-
40, 849 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); text accompanying note 134 infra.
36. The Court reasoned that a defendant's knowledge of trial procedure
"was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to de-
fend himself." 422 U.S. at 836. The Court ruled that a defendant need only
know "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" to be capable of
effecting a voluntary and intelligent waiver. Id. at 835.
37. 408 A.2d at 376.
38. The court explained that
Whalem and succeeding cases have laid substantially more emphasis
on the strength of the evidence supporting an insanity defense than on
the defendant's choice. In contrast, Alford and Faretta reason that re-
spect for a defendant's freedom as a person mandates that he or she be
permitted to make fundamental decisions about the course of the pro-
ceedings.
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freedom to make a voluntary and intelligent rejection of the in-
sanity defense. The Frendak court reasoned that, since defend-
ants "must bear the ultimate consequences of any decision,"39
they should have the right to make decisions central to their
defense.
Just as the Supreme Court recognized valid reasons for de-
fendant Alford to plead guilty and defendant Faretta to repre-
sent himself, the Frendak court found valid reasons for a
defendant to reject the insanity plea. The court reasoned that a
defendant might rationally prefer a finite prison term to an in-
determinate commitment, a structured prison life to the often
harsh and dangerous environment of a mental hospital, the
stigma of the label "convict" to that of "ex-mental patient," the
loss of few legal rights to the loss of many, and a deserved pun-
ishment to the denigration of the defendant's motives for com-
mitting the offense.40 The Frendak court reasoned that these
concerns 41 justified an absolute deference to a defendant's re-
jection of the insanity plea, and "substantially outweigh[ed]
the express purpose of Whalem: to ensure that some abstract
concept of justice is satisfied by protecting one who may be
morally blameless from a conviction and punishment which he
or she might choose to accept."42
C. UNITED STATES V. WRIGHT
In United States v. Wright,43 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court retained the Whalem approach and strongly criti-
39. Id. at 378.
40. Id. at 376-78.
41. For a more detailed discussion of these and other concerns, see notes
93-99 infra and accompanying text.
42. 408 A.2d at 378.
43. 627 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Wright, the defendant had destroyed a
glass-encased replica of the United States Capitol building, claiming that God
had chosen him as a prophet to the world. Id. at 1302. The trial court found the
defendant competent to stand trial, and, upon learning that he would not raise
the insanity defense because he feared it would denigrate the religious motiva-
tions for his actions, held hearings to determine if it should impose the defense
despite the defendant's rejection. After listening to conflicting psychiatric testi-
mony and reviewing a previous insanity acquittal of the defendant, id. at 1303-
04, 1305 n.26, the trial court decided not to impose the defense. Id. at 1305.
The defendant was ultimately convicted of destroying government property
and sentenced to three years imprisonment. Id. at 1302. The defendant ap-
pealed this conviction, contending that the trial court had abused its discretion
in failing to raise the insanity defense despite the defendant's refusal to raise it
himself. Id. The appellate record does not reveal whether the defendant
changed his mind and no longer objected to pleading the defense, or whether
the appeal was merely a strategic attempt to gain a new trial.
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cized the Frendak court's analysis. The circuit court held that,
although the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to impose the insanity defense over the defendant's objec-
tions,4 4 a court should impose the defense upon an unwilling
defendant when there is a sufficient question as to whether the
defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the of-
fense.45
The Wright court based its retention of Whalem on three
arguments. First, the court contended that the Alford and
Faretta decisions were irrelevant to the question of whether to
impose the insanity defense over a defendant's objections. 46
The court emphasized that society has an "obligation, through
the insanity defense, to withhold punishment of someone not
blameworthy."47 This obligation creates a duty to impose the
insanity defense despite a defendant's rejection. The Wright
court argued that, because the Supreme Court had no occasion
to consider this obligation when it decided Alford and Faretta,
the two cases could not control the court's decision. In mini-
mizing the relevance of Alford and Faretta,48 the court implic-
itly dismissed any consideration of the Supreme Court's
emphasis on a defendant's rights, and instead deferred abso-
lutely to a court's societal duty "not to impose punishment
where it cannot impose blame."49
The Wright court also argued that its approach, like the
Frendak approach, both acknowledges and respects a defend-
ant's choice. Although the court admitted that it could not "ab-
dicate to the defendant the judicial duty to explore the issue
[of sanity] once sufficient questions are raised,"50 it intimated
44. The circuit court admitted that the evidence cast doubt upon the de-
fendant's sanity at the time of the crime, but claimed that the trial court had
painstakingly explored the issue and that the trial court's decision was thus un-
assailable. Id. at 1306-09.
45. The court noted, in wording similar to that in Whalem, that the issue is
"whether there is sufficient question to require jury consideration of the de-
fendant's ability to understand the law and conform his conduct to it ... " Id.
at 1310; see text accompanying note 16 supra.
46. "Neither case involved an insanity issue, and for that reason alone
their relevance is de minimus." 627 F.2d at 1310 (footnote omitted).
47. Id. The court stressed the necessity of adhering to this societal duty.
"A plainly nonfrivolous challenge to a defendant's mental responsibility re-
quired inquiry because it suggests that the free will presupposed by our crimi-
nal justice system cannot be presumed." Id.
48. The court further minimized the relevance of Alford by noting that it
does not give a defendant the absolute right to have his or her guilty plea ac-
cepted. Id. at 1310 & n.74.
49. Id. at 1310 n.76.
50. Id. at 1310-11.
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that when "doubts about a defendant's mental condition re-
main after a full inquiry, the strength and reasons for the de-
fendant's opposition ... [might] tip the balance."5 1
Finally, the Wright court suggested that a Frendak inquiry
into a defendant's capacity to make a voluntary and intelligent
choice essentially duplicates both the form and result of a
Whalem investigation into the merits of the insanity defense.52
Given this alleged similarity between the two approaches, the
Wright court, preferring the continued use of the Whalem ap-
proach, argued that the Frendak court merely recreated a
Whalem inquiry under labels less candid and clear, and thus
"obscured" and "distorted" society's obligation to withhold
punishment from those not criminally responsible. 53
I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FRENDAK AND WRIGHT
APPROACHES
A. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE APPROACHES
Although the Wright court argued that the Frendak and
Wright approaches are similar54-- and both do require a court
to examine the defendant's sanity in a broad sense-the ap-
proaches differ in two critical respects. First, even though both
require a court to assess the defendant's mental condition,
each focuses on a different time at which that condition is man-
ifested. A court applying the Frendak "voluntary and intelli-
gent" approach considers only the quality of the defendant's
pleading, and thus focuses on the defendant's mental condition
at the time of trial.55 In contrast, a court applying the Wright
51. Id. at 1311.
The defendant's opposition to the defense may reflect his under-
standing of his mental state at the time of the alleged offense. It may
also provide more general insight into the quality of his reasoning. Fi-
nally, it may deserve ultimate deference where insanity has not been
established, and the defendant's own dignity and decisionmaking re-
quire respect.
Id. at 1311 n.80.
52. Id. at 1311-12. The court noted that a Frendak analysis of the "volun-
tary" aspect of a defendant's plea must necessarily consider whether the de-
fendant's mental condition coerced him or her into refusing the insanity plea.
Id. Moreover, the court claimed that the "intelligent" criterion demands an ex-
amination of the "quality of the defendant's own reasoning and the circum-
stances under which the plea decision is made"--essentially an inquiry into the
defendant's sanity. Id. at 1312.
53. Id.
54. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
55. The Frendak court, minimizing the relevance of the defendant's past
state of mind, stated: 'The strength of the individual's potential insanity de-
fense should not be a factor in the court's decision, except to the extent that
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analysis considers primarily the strength of the insanity de-
fense,5 6 and thus focuses on the defendant's condition at the
time of the commission of the offense.
The different implications of adopting one or the other of
the approaches can be illustrated by use of a hypothetical case.
Imagine a case in which the defendant irrationally murders an-
other under conditions that suggest the act was situational-
that is, that the defendant responded abnormally to a series of
coincidental circumstances, unlikely to recur. Although the de-
fendant potentially could suffer a "relapse" of this "situational
disturbance,"57 the defendant behaves quite normally when not
faced with the combination of relevant circumstances. Thus at
the time of pleading, the accused is alert, calm, and intelli-
gent-in most significant respects, a rational human being. For
any of the reasons discussed in Frendak,58 however, the de-
fendant refuses to raise the insanity defense, despite the
judge's explanation of the consequences of this action.
Assume further two courts, one following the Frendak ap-
proach and the other the Wright approach. Even if both courts
evaluated the defendant's mental condition by the same crite-
ria,59 one court would impose the insanity defense while the
such evidence is useful in determining whether the defendant presently is ca-
pable of rationally deciding to reject the defense." 408 A.2d at 380-81.
56. For a discussion of the Wright court's inconsistency in allowing even a
minimal deferral to a defendant's choice, see note 63 infra.57. The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic Manual describes
"situational disturbances" as
more or less transient disorders of any severity (including those of
psychotic proportions) that occur in individuals without any apparent
underlying disorders and that represent an acute reaction to over-
whelming stress .... If the patient has good adaptive capacity his
symptoms usually recede as the stress diminishes. If, however, the
symptoms persist after the stress is removed, the diagnosis of another
mental disorder is indicated.
DSM-HI, supra note 14, at 48.
Although the incidence of situational disturbances among all psychiatric
patients varies among different subgroups of the population-rarely exceeding
one percent, see A. FREEDMAN, H. KAPLAN, & B. SADOCK, MODERN SYNOPSIS OF
COMPREHENSrVE TEXTBOOK OF PsYciIATRY I, at 787 (2d ed. 1976)-diagnoses of
situational disorders have significantly increased in frequency since World War
I. Looney & Gunderson, Transient Situational Disturbances: Course and Out-
come, 135 AM. J. PsYcmATRY 660, 666 (1978). Moreover, in a recent New York
c6unty hospital study, thirty-five percent of the patients diagnosed as suffering
from a situational disturbance exhibited "angry, hostile, and destructive behav-
ior, often including assaultive violence. . . "; for ten percent this behavior was
"the most salient feature" of their reaction. A. FREEDMAN, H. KAPLAN, & B.
SADocK, supra, at 787. Thus, the defendant in the hypothetical case suffers
from a plausible, though somewhat uncommon, mental disease.
58. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
59. Although the timing issue discussed below, see text accompanying
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other would not. The court using the Frendak approach would
essentially ignore the defendant's situational disorder 6O and in-
stead would probe the quality of the defendant's decision to re-
ject the insanity defense. Since the hypothetical defendant
would satisfy the three criteria defining a "voluntary and intel-
ligent" choice,6 ' the court would respect the defendant's deci-
sion and would not impose the defense. A court employing a
Wright analysis, on the other hand, would inquire whether
there was a "sufficient question" as to the defendant's sanity at
the time he or she allegedly committed the offense. Because
mental illness inspired the offense in the hypothetical case, a
court following Wright would ignore the defendant's voluntary
and intelligent decision, and would impose the insanity defense
over the defendant's objections.62
Even in a case in which the time factor discussed above
was irrelevant, the two approaches might reach opposite con-
clusions 63 because the two use different standards to assess the
defendant's mental condition. For example, consider a hypo-
thetical case in which a defendant murders another as the re-
sult of an incurable mental disorder accompanied by acute
delusions. 64 Despite the persistence of the defendant's delu-
notes 60-62 infra, is arguably also a criterion, for the purpose of discussion this
Note distinguishes this issue from the other criteria.
60. See note 111 supra.
61. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
62. The two tests' difference in timing will lead to opposite results in situa-
tions other than that in which a defendant suffers from a situational disorder.
For example, a defendant afflicted with a mental disease that drugs can control
might be irrational and legally insane at the time of the criminal act, yet at trial
possess the capacity and knowledge to make an intelligent choice. A court fol-
lowing Wright would impose the defense over the defendant's objections; a
court following Frendak would not.
63. Even the aspect of the defendant's mental condition that both ap-
proaches require a court to consider-the defendant's reasons to reject the in-
sanity defense-receives dissimilar treatment. Under the Frendak approach a
court gives these reasons great weight as the defendant's motives for control-
ling his or her own defense. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra. Under
the Wright approach a court uses them to determine, for example, the defend-
ant's mental state at the time of his or her criminal acts. See note 51 supra.
To the extent that the Wright court deferred to the defendant's wishes out
of regard for his interests, see note 51 supra, it abandoned its central goal of
evaluating the strength of the defendant's insanity defense. The court un-
doubtedly felt it had to partially accede to the defendant's wishes because of
the many District of Columbia Circuit Court cases after Whalem, that recog-
nized the paramount importance of a defendant's wishes. See United States v.
Bradley, 463 F.2d 808, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cross v. United States, 389 F.2d
957, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Trest v. United States, 350 F.2d 794, 795 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018 (1965).
64. The defendant might suffer, for example, from schizophrenia, paranoid
type.
[Vol. 65:927
INSANITY DEFENSE
sions, the court finds the defendant competent to stand trial.65
Refusing to plead the insanity defense, the defendant pleads
not guilty. In the first hypothetical case, the time factor was
crucial since the defendant regained his sanity before he pled.
In this second case, however, the time factor is largely irrele-
vant since the defendant's condition at the time of trial is sub-
stantially the same as it was at the time of the crime's
commission. If, as the Wright court asserted,66 the approaches
65. If it were true that a defendant competent to stand trial was also com-
petent to make a voluntary and intelligent rejection of the insanity defense-
that is, if the standards for the competency to stand trial test and the Frendak
test were equivalent-one could prove, with ample precedent, that the Frendak
and Wright approaches differ. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 389
(1966) (test for competency to stand trial is not the same as that for criminal
responsibility); Wolcott v. United States, 407 F.2d 1149, 1151 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969); James v. Boles, 339 F.2d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 1964);
People v. Nichols, 70 Ill. App. 3d 748, 753-54, 388 N.E.2d 984, 988 (1979). Several
courts, however, including those in the District of Columbia, wisely recognize
that the competency standard established by the Supreme Court is not an ade-
quate measure of the defendant's ability to make a voluntary and intelligent re-
jection of a fundamental right. See United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 726
n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 388 F. Supp. 221, 225 (S.D.N.Y.),
afd on other grounds, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 937
(1976); Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 379 (D.C. 1979); State v. Walton,
228 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Iowa 1975). Competency to stand trial only requires that a
defendant have a "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding ... [and a] factual understanding
of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960). Such a standard does not evaluate whether a defendant is capable of
making intelligent decisions on important matters relating to his or her de-
fense.
Some courts, however, hold that the criteria for evaluating competency to
stand trial are identical to those for evaluating a waiver of constitutional rights
in a criminal trial. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d
339, 342 n.2 (3d Cir. 1975); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649, 654 (5th
Cir. 1974); State v. Contreras, 112 Ariz. 359, 359-60, 542 P.2d 17, 18-19 (1975); Peo-
ple v. Heral, 62 IlM. 2d 329, 334, 342 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1976). See generally Note, Com-
petency to Plead Guilty: A New Standard, 1974 DUKE L.J. 149, 154-55;
Comment, Competence to Plead and the Retarded Defendant: United States v.
Masthers, 9 CoNN. L. REv. 176 (1976).
66. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. The Wright court not only
asserted that the two approaches are similar as they are now formulated, but
also implicitly intimated that a requirement mandated in Alford-that trial
courts accept a defendant's voluntary and intelligent guilty plea only if the rec-
ord evidences a factual basis for the plea-must be included in the application
of the Frendak approach, thus making the two approaches even more similar.
See United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d at 1310 n.74 (citing North Carolina v. Al-
ford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.10.). Although the Wright court did not develop the argu-
ment, the Supreme Court's mandate, on its face, would seem to require that
courts employing the Frendak approach not allow a defendant to reject an in-
sanity plea unless the record evidences the defendant's sanity at the time of
the crime. This requirement would make Frendak's investigation essentially
similar to Wright's investigation.
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use equivalent criteria, a court deciding this second hypotheti-
cal case would reach the same result regardless of the ap-
proach it chose.
The approaches, however, do differ in their criteria. The
Frendak approach directs a court to evaluate the three aspects
of voluntary and intelligent decisions: the voluntariness of the
defendant's plea, the defendant's knowledge of the available
options, and the defendant's capacity to weigh those options ra-
tionally.67 A court employing this approach thus questions
whether the defendant is functioning rationally in the context
of his or her plea decision. Specifically, the court asks whether
the defendant voluntarily refused to raise the insanity de-
fense-that is, whether the prosecutor illegally threatened or
coerced the defendant into refusing to raise the insanity de-
fense; whether the defendant knows the length of the sentence
that might be imposed upon conviction; whether the defendant
is informed of the time that might be spent in a mental hospital
if he or she is acquitted upon the insanity defense; and
whether the defendant has the mental capacity to choose be-
tween alternative pleas in accordance with his or her best in-
terests.
Under the Wright approach, on the other hand, a court ap-
plies its jurisdiction's criminal test of insanity:68 the court fo-
cuses on whether the defendant knew right from wrong, as
defined by the M'Naghton rule,69 or whether the defendant
could not conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the
law, as defined by the Model Penal Code (ALI).70 A court em-
67. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
68. Most American courts have endorsed one of two insanity tests. See
notes 69-70 infra.,
69. The M'Naghten rule states, "[Alt the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from a disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." Queen v.
M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). For examples of its present application,
see, e.g., McKinney v. State, 566 P.2d 653 (Alaska 1977); State v. Doss, 116 Ariz.
156, 568 P.2d 1054 (1977); People v. Rockamann, 79 Ill. App. 3d 575, 399 N.E.2d 162
(1979).
70. The Model Penal Code states:
1. A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
2. As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962). For examples of courts that use
this test, see, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); People
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ploying this approach thus questions whether the defendant
functioned rationally in the context of his or her criminal act.
Specifically, the court asks whether the defendant knew, at the
time the defendant committed the criminal offense, that the act
was wrongful; whether the defendant's disease diminished his
or her capability to reason so that the defendant thought the
criminal act was acceptable to society and the law; and whether
the defendant's delusions forced him or her to kill.
Because the Wright court implicitly assumed a different
psychological model than did the Frendak court, it failed to see
that the differences in the two approaches may produce differ-
ent results.7 1 The Wright court assumed that if a defendant's
"insanity" caused him or her to act irrationally in the context of
the crime, the insanity would also prevent the defendant from
rationally deciding whether to plead the insanity defense. The
Wright court thus claimed that although the two approaches
differ in the context in which they focus on the defendant's
mental state, a court would conclude the same under either ap-
proach.7 2 The Frendak court, on the other hand, implicitly as-
sumed that even a defendant whose "insanity" caused the
commission of a crime could perhaps act rationally in the con-
text of choosing whether to plead the insanity defense. This as-
sumption was based on the more current and generally
accepted view of a person's capacity to reason, a view that ar-
gues against dividing the mind into separable categories such
as "emotion" or "reason,"7 3 and suggests that a mental illness
might impair one's ability to act rationally in a given social situ-
ation, yet allow one to reason rationally in other contexts. 7 4
v. Lutman, 104 Cal. App. 3d 64, 163 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1980); Graham v. State, 547
S.W. 2d 531 (Tenn. 1977).
71. Admittedly, the results are identical if a court applying the Frendak
test finds that the defendant's decision is not voluntary and intelligent. See
note 25 supra. A difference in results occurs when the defendant makes a vol-
untary and intelligent choice to reject the insanity defense, and thus triggers
Frendak's injunction against disturbing that decision.
72. See 627 F.2d at 1311-12.
73. Contemporary psychiatrists generally do not divide the brain into all-
inclusive compartments such as "reason" or "will" As the District of Columbia
Circuit Court cautioned, "[t]he modern science of psychology ... does not
conceive that there is a separate little man in the top of one's head called rea-
son whose function it is to guide another unruly little man called instinct, emo-
tion, or impulse in the way he should go." Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d
665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 852 (1948). Rather, psychiatrists
now examine a patient's mind as a whole, and look specifically to the functions
the mind must perform. See N. F'n=, supra note 26, at 132; ROYAL COMMIS-
SION ON CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953, REPORT, CME. No. 8932, at 79 (1953).
74. This tenet finds support in the numerous examples of mental patients
who act irrationally in one situation, yet reason capably when they confront
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Because the criteria of the approaches differ, the result in
the second hypothetical case7 5 depends on which approach is
applied. The defendant's severe delusions would probably lead
a court applying the Wright approach to impose the insanity
defense, since the defense would appear sufficiently strong. A
court applying the Frendak approach, however, might defer to
the defendant's decision to reject the defense since, under the
psychological model that it assumes, the defendant's capacity
to compare the prospect of commitment to that of a prison sen-
tence need not relate to his or her knowledge of whether mur-
der was right or wrong. Even if the defendant's delusions-
which may have compelled the murder-persist at trial, the de-
fendant might yet be capable of understanding the plea alter-
natives and of evaluating the potentially valid reasons to reject
the insanity defense.
B. THE COMPETING INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE APPROACHES
Further analysis of the Frendak and Wright approaches
suggests that they reach different results not only because of
their differences in criteria, underlying psychological models,
and focus as to the time at which the defendant's mental condi-
tion is manifested, but also because of the differing weights
they assign to the defendant's and society's interests.
1. The Defendant's Interests and the Frendak Approach
The Frendak court's primary emphasis on protecting the
defendant's interests7 6 parallels increasing judicial protection
of various general liberty interests of convicts and criminal de-
fendants. For example, courts have recently 77 extended to con-
victs a right to freedom from excessive punishment,7 8 a right to
matters outside their delusional system. See B. HART, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IN-
sANrr 96-97 (5th ed. 1957); note 136 infra.
75. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
77. Prior to the 1960s, the Supreme Court refused to review prison admin-
istrative decisions affecting the constitutional rights of prisoners. See Calhoun,
The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal,
4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 220-21 (1977).
78. Courts have held that some punishments may be too severe in light of
the crime committed, and thus may violate the eighth amendment's guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
589 (1977) (death penalty for rape); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 205-06 (1976)
(dictum) (death penalty for armed robbery); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,
576-77 (8th Cir. 1968) (excessive corporal punishment). The Supreme Court
has subsequently held that it will not review the excessiveness of sentence of
imprisonment. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (upholding
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adequate conditions within prison,7 9 and a right to a hearing
before revocation of parole.80 In addition, courts recognize the
right of criminal defendants to form their defense strategy
largely free from judicial encroachment.8 1 Thus, courts, refus-
ing to overrule a defendant's strategic decision, have allowed
defendants voluntarily and intelligently to waive various consti-
tutional rights.82 In Alford,83 the Supreme Court permitted a
defendant to waive the three constitutional rights forfeited by a
guilty plea: the fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion, the sixth amendment right to trial by jury, and the sixth
amendment right to confront one's accusers. 84 In Faretta, the
mandatory life sentence imposed under a Texas statute where defendant had
been convicted of three minor felony offenses). Nonetheless, states can still in-
validate sentences they judge to be excessive under their state constitutional
cruel or unusual punishment clauses. See, e.g., Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815,
819 (Alaska 1968) (sentence violated both federal and state constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment). See also Note, Dispropor-
tionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 CoLumr. L REv. 1119, 1120 n.6 (1979).
79. Courts have held some prison facilities to be inadequate and thus vio-
lative of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (dictum) (inadequate
medical care); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 932 (1978) (failure to provide reasonable protection from violent inmates);
Hutto v. Finney, 410 F. Supp. 251, 277-78 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (overcrowded and
dirty cells, inadequate food), affid, 548 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir.), aFd on other
grounds, 437 U.S. 678 (1977). But cf. Burrell v. McGray, 426 U.S. 471 (1976) (re-
considering and dismissing a grant of certiorari in a case involving a claim that
prison conditions were poor).
80. Several Supreme Court decisions have extended to convicts the four-
teenth amendment's due process guarantees when parole boards have sought
to cancel their prior approval of parole. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 790-91 (1973) (right to counsel at some revocation hearings); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485, 487-88 (1972) (revocation of parole requires both a pre-
liminary hearing and a revocation hearing). Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974) (due process extends to all disciplinary hearings where "good
time" credits may be revoked).
81. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280
(1942) (right to waive counsel). Judicial respect for a defendant's trial strategy
can be traced to the Anglo-American "adversary model, which provides sub-
stantial leeway for litigants to define their own self-interest [and] favors this
free choice.. . ." Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the Ameri-
can Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1978).
82. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennesee, 406 U.S. 605, 613 (1972) ("the accused and
his counsel may not be restricted in deciding whether, and when in the course
of presenting his defense, the accused should take the stand"); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (waiver of right to counsel); United States v.
Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977) (waiver
of the statute of limitations); United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d
386, 390 (2d Cir. 1970) (waiver of non-English speaking defendant's right to
translation at trial).
83. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
84. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). However, since these
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Court permitted waiver of a defendant's right to counsel.8 5
These decisions, particularly Alford,.6 are consistent with
Frendak, and inconsistent with Wright.87 Like the Alford
court, the Frendak court deferred to the defendant's strategic
plea decision, even though the defendant "waived" a seemingly
important claim of innocence. 88 Because the Supreme Court's
deferral in Alford involved waiver of fundamental, explicitly
constitutional rights, the Court presumably would defer even
more readily to waiver of the right to plead insanity-a right of
lesser importance. The Supreme Court has refused to deline-
ate a particular form of the insanity defense, 89 and it is unlikely
that the Court will become more insistent upon a strict protec-
tion of the right to plead insanity.90
Judicial deference to a defendant's strategy should also ar-
guably apply to a defendant's decision not to plead insanity,91
rights are fundamental, "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
[their] waiver." Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
85. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
86. Alford is more analogous to the context of a defendants rejection of the
insanity defense because it, unlike Faretta, contained a plea decision. More-
over, the result in Faretta was based not only upon a defendant's ability to
waive a right, but upon a finding that a defendant has an affirmative constitu-
tional right to defend himself pro se. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the importance of Alford and Faretta in the context of
imposing the insanity defense, see Singer, supra note 4, at 655-59.
87. In Alford, the Supreme Court read its decision in Lynch v. Overholser,
369 U.S. 705 (1962), discussed in note 17 supra, as intimating that it would not
be unconstitutional for a court to accept a defendant's voluntary and intelligent
guilty plea, even though the "evidence before the judge indicated that there
was a valid [insanity] defense." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. at 35. A long
line of decisions allow defendants to waive a guilty plea. See, e.g., Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493
(1962); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
88. 408 A.2d at 378; see text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
89. The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justifica-
tion, and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly
shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the
criminal law and changing religious, moral philosophical, and medical
views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always
been thought to be the province of the States.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968).
90. See note 89 supra. Many scholars have argued for the abolition of the
insanity defense. See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-
Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Ringer & McCormack, The Elusive Insanity
Defense, 63 A.B.A.J. 1721 (1977). But see Pasework & Pasework, Insanity Re-
vised. Once More Over the Cuckoo's Nest, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 481 (1978).
91. Admittedly, the Supreme Court's explicit refusal in Alford to bestow
upon the defendant an absolute, unconditional right to a voluntary and intelli-
gent guilty plea blunts this analysis. 400 U.S. at 38 n.11. One could argue that
even if Alford allows courts discretion to impose pleas upon defendants, the
Frendak approach goes too far in making a court's acceptance of a voluntary
and intelligent plea mandatory. The Court in Alford, however, specifically
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since the reasons for rejecting the insanity defense reveal
sound, strategic considerations. 92 Defendants may not wish to
disparage or deny the validity of their motives for committing a
crime by pleading insanity.93 They may prefer a limited prison
term to the indefinite commitment likely to follow an insanity
acquittal,94 or they may object to the quality of treatment in a
mental hospital.95 They may want to avoid the stigma that typi-
cally accompanies an adjudication of insanity-a stigma that
often surpasses that accompanying a criminal conviction.9 6
They may attempt to pressure the jury into acquitting them by
not offering the jury the "compromise" verdict of insanity,97 or
they may prefer to use the evidence of their lack of mental re-
sponsibility not to plead insanity, but only to achieve a convic-
noted that states could constitutionally make acceptance of a guilty plea abso-
lute. Id. Moreover, the strength of the Court's endorsement of discretion is far
from clear, since the Court has neither rejected nor articulated any reason to
reject a guilty plea made voluntarily and intelligently. See, e.g., cases cited in
note 87 supra. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however,
gives federal courts discretion to reject a guilty plea despite a defendant's vol-
untary and intelligent plea decision. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; see McCoy v. United
States, 363 F.2d 306, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
92. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has recognized both the validity of stra-
tegic reasons to refuse to raise the insanity defense, and the difficulties in sec-
ond guessing such reasons. United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1164 (5th
Cir. 1974).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
94. See, e.g., People v. Redmond, 16 Cal. App. 3d 931, 934-35, 94 Cal. Rptr.
543, 545-46 (1971).
95. See, e.g., Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C. 1979). See
also Note, Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1195-97 (1974).
96. Reactions against those who have been committed can be quite hostile,
especially if the patient is committed due to a criminal act. See Cocozes, Public
Perceptions of the Criminally Insane, 29 HosPrrAL & CoMMuNITY PsYcHIATRY
457, 458 (1978); Note, supra note 95, at 1200. Cf. United States ex rel. Schuster
v. Herald, 410 F.2d 1071, 1073 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 487 (1969) (reaction
in the hospital toward the committed patient). This factor reveals an ironical
twist in the Wright court's desire to withhold blame from the blameless; in-
stead of aiding the defendant, a court applying the Wright test condemns the
defendant to a punishment more severe than the defendant's preferred option
of a prison term.
97. A defendant not offering the jury a compromise verdict is analogous to
a defense counsel not requesting an instruction to the jury specifying lessor in-
cluded offenses. A defense attorney may want 'the jurors to recognize that the
one crime charged is too Draconian, so that their exercise of mercy will be in
the form of acquittal rather than a finding of guilt on a lesser offense." George,
Lesser Included Offenses in Michigan, 1975 DET. C. L REv. 35, 37. Cf. Comment,
The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Iowa: The Gordian Knot Untied, 59
IowA L. REV. 684, 684 (1974) ("[t]o increase the likelihood of conviction on some
charge, [the prosecutor] might request submission of a lesser included offense
composed of those elements of the charged offense which have been ade-
quately proven").
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tion of a lesser offense than that with which they are charged.98
Finally, they may be opposed to psychiatric treatment.99
Courts have begun to recognize the validity of this last rea-
son in an analogous area of the law by granting mental patients
a right to refuse psychiatric treatment. 0 0 Although few state
statutes provide this protection for the hospitalized mentally
il1,101 an increasing number of courts have turned to constitu-
tional guarantees102 to shield these patients from unchecked,
significant intrusions into their mental processes. 03 As their
98. Dr. Dennis Philander has observed that defendants in Minnesota often
adopt this strategy. Telephone interview with Dr. Dennis Philander, M.D., doc-
tor of psychiatry, Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology Ltd. (Febru-
ary 1, 1981). Defendants will use this tactic most often wrhen facing a homicide
charge, to claim, for example, that their mental illness prevented them from
premeditating or deliberating. See, e.g., People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 818-19,
394 P.2d 959, 975-76, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 285 (1964); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468
Pa. 210, 220-21, 360 A.2d 914, 919-20 (1976). This approach has been endorsed by
many state courts. See, e.g., State v. Donahue, 141 Conn. 656, 665, 109 A.2d 364,
368 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 926 (1955); State v. Moeller, 50 Hawaii 110, 120,
433 P.2d 136, 143 (1967).
One commentator has equated this tactic to that of a claim of diminished
responsibility-a claim unanimously rejected by American courts-and has dis-
paraged its use. See Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Re-
sponsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLum. L. REv.
827, 831 (1977).
99. See cases cited in note 102 infra.
100. Plotkin notes that "there is a growing body of precedent from a diverse
range of courts that reflects a solid trend toward ultimate judicial recognition of
a constitutional 'right' to refuse treatment." Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic
Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L REv. 461, 491
(1977) (footnote omitted). See Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Ther-
apy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REv. 331, 345 (1981); cases cited in notes 102-103
infra.
101. Most states afford patients only limited statutory protection from unin-
vited psychiatric care. California is a notable exception. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 2670.5 (West Supp. 1970-1979) (competent persons can refuse organic thera-
pies). For a list of the state statutes giving mental patients some form of a
right to refuse treatment, see Plotkin, supra note 100, at 504-25.
102. Courts have based this right to refuse treatment on several constitu-
tional guarantees: the eighth amendment, see, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d
1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973),
the thirteenth amendment, see, e.g., Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir.
1966) (refusal allowed if program is devoid of therapeutic purposes), the first
amendment, Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir.) (religious freedom), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978)
(right to privacy); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-
19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973) (right to privacy). The
Kaimowitz court was the first court to expand the right of privacy to include
the right of prisoners to refuse psychiatric treatment. For the full text of
Kaimowitz, see A. BROoKs, LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
902 (1974); for a summary, see 42 U.S.L.W. 2063, 2063-64 (July 31, 1973).
103. Generally, the more intrusive the therapy, the less likely the court will
allow hospitals to ignore patients' refusal of treatment. Stone, The Right of the
Psychiatric Patient to Refuse Treatment, 4 J. PSYCHIATRY & 1- 515, 520 (1976).
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standard for accepting a patient's refusal, these courts have es-
tablished a voluntary and intelligent test identical to that of the
Frendak approach. 0 4 Thus, their decisions support the argu-
ment that courts should respect a defendant's refusal to plead
insanity to the extent that the defendant's decision reflects a
desire to maintain his or her mental integrity.
Perhaps the only valid argument against an unqualified use
of the Frendak approach is its failure to require a court explic-
itly to consider broader social concerns. Although the Frendak
court adequately examined the defendant's reasons for re-
jecting the insanity defense, it failed to inquire into the poten-
tial social interests favoring the trial judge's imposition of the
defense, or to ask whether it could satisfy these social concerns
within its framework. Therefore, the interests arguably pro-
tected by the Wright approach must be analyzed before a deci-
sion concerning the appropriate test can be made.
2. Societal Interests and the Wright Approach
The District of Columbia Circuit Court's suggestion in
Lynch, Whalem, and Wright, that "[s]ociety has a stake in see-
ing to it that a defendant who needs hospital care does not go
to prison,"105 leaves undefined the interests that justify impos-
ing the insanity defense over the defendant's objection. The
See Winick, supra note 100, at 351-52; Note, Advances in Mental Health: A Case
for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354, 363 (1975). Courts have
found a right to refuse treatment in the context of psychosurgery, see, e.g.,
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), psychotropic medication, see, e.g., Scott v.
Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1140
(8th Cir. 1973); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1368 (D. Mass. 1979), elec-
troconvulsive therapy, see, e.g., Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp. at Eloise, 384
F. Supp. 1085, 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1974), and milieu therapy, see, e.g., Jobson v.
Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1966).
104. The courts that give patients a right to refuse treatment generally re-
quire the patient to be competent enough to waive this right knowingly and vol-
untarily. See, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1138-39 (8th Cir. 1973);
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1368 (D. Mass. 1979). See generally Winick,
supra note 100, at 383-92. In the past, some courts did not recognize a right to
refuse treatment for those involuntarily committed, on the assumption that
such patients could not be competent enough to render an informed and intelli-
gent choice. See, e.g., Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 259, 239 N.W.2d 905, 909
(1976). Now, some courts require hospitals to investigate whether involuntarily
committed patients are able to make informed and intelligent decisions. See,
e.g., Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971). Cf. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (D.N.J. 1978) (patient must
have "capacity" to understand situation and be "free from state coercion").
105. Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
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court's statement nevertheless invokes several broad social in-
terests.
Imposition of the insanity defense promotes a societal in-
terest specifically discussed in Lynch, Whalem, and Wright-
the interest in withholding punishment from the morally
blameless.1 06 This interest is founded upon the notions that
the state should punish crimes instead of punishing acts alone,
and that the state should limit its intrusion upon the individual
to cases involving truly criminal actions. 0 7 Under the Wright
court's approach, our legal system would be undermined when
morally blameless defendants reject a defense acknowledging
their blamelessness and, instead, invite criminal sanction.108 If
evidence exists that an act lacked a criminal component, as in a
case involving an insane defendant,109 a Wright analysis sug-
gests that the criminal sanction may be inappropriate and that,
at most, the state should seek some noncriminal disposition
through the imposition of the insanity defense.
In the context of deciding whether to impose the insanity
defense, this societal interest is furthered most when the de-
fendant's moral blameworthiness is an element of the crime-
that is, when prosecution must establish moral blameworthi-
106. See text accompanying notes 17-22, 46-49 supra. Courts and commenta-
tors have long articulated this tenet. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862,
876 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir.
1945); 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 20, 21 (1765); H. FINGAREflrE, THE MEAN-
ING OF CRnmuNAL INsANrrY 7 (1972); Hippard, The Unconstitutionality of Crimi-
nal Liability Without Fault: An Argument for A Constitutional Doctrine of
Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1039 (1973).
107. "A jail sentence is punitive and is to be imposed by the judge within
the limits set by the legislature. Hospitalization is remedial and its limits are
determined by the condition to be treated." Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d at
393-94.
108. One implication of the possible decreased use of the insanity defense
under the Frendak approach is the possible derogation of any recognized right
to the defense. Some courts have already questioned the defense's importance
in the criminal law. See, e.g., United States ex reL Landati v. Ternullo, 423 F.
Supp. 1210, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 474 (R.L 1979).
Cf. Trembley v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569, 570 (D.C. 1961) (violation of due
process to impose the insanity defense on an unwilling defendant); White v.
State, 17 Md. App. 58, 61, 299 A.2d 873, 875 (1973) (insanity defense is no differ-
ent than other affirmative defenses). But see Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 141,
153-54, 132 So. 581, 582 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110, 110 P. 1020,
1025 (1910). Perhaps more importantly, deviation from a strict standard of
moral culpability might eventually lead to the complete abandonment of a re-
quirement of moral blameworthiness. Some advocate this approach. See, e.g.,
B. WooTrEN, CRME AND THE CRsmAL LAw 40-57 (1963). With no such require-
ment, society would punish acts and not crimes.
109. See notes 18, 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
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ness in order to establish its case.1 10 This rigorous "element"
interpretation imposes upon the court a positive duty to raise
the insanity defense if there is a sufficient question concerning
the defendant's sanity.l Under a less rigorous interpretation
of the moral blameworthiness standard, the court merely pos-
sesses the discretion to raise the defense to prevent possible
abuses of the criminal sanction. The Wright court's discretion-
ary imposition of the insanity defense in cases involving a "suf-
ficient question" as to a defendant's sanity represents this
latter interpretation.
It is not clear, however, that either the "element" interpre-
tation or the Wright interpretation justifies the imposition of
the insanity defense over a defendant's objections. There have
long been limitations on the legal relevance of moral blamewor-
thiness. In the civil context, courts have often held defendants
strictly liable for blameless conduct.112 In the criminal context,
110. Although the federal courts have long recognized that sanity is an es-
sential element of any crime, see Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895);
United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 624, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the Supreme
Court has held that a state can rationally conclude differently. See Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975)
("the existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relation-
ship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the
crime"). Although most states have not decided whether the insanity defense
implicates an essential element of the crime, their assignment of the burden of
proof indicates their attitude toward the defense. In states where the prosecu-
tion must prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, see, e.g.,
Dolchok v. State, 519 P.2d 457, 460 (Alaska 1974); State v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332,
334, 529 P.2d 231, 233 (1974); Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 510, 200 A.2d 150, 155
(1964), the law considers the defendant's sanity essential to the prosecutor's
case. See H. WEIHOFEN, INsANrrY AS A DEFENSE IN CRiMINAL LAw 158 (1933). In
states where the defendant must prove by the preponderance of the evidence
that he or she was insane, see, e.g., People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288, 297, 363 P.2d
865, 869, 14 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637 (1961); State v. Buzynski, 330 A.2d 422, 429-30 (Me.
1974); State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 144, 100 N.W.2d 508, 513 (1960), the law does
not consider sanity an element of the crime. Comment, The Burden of Proof
and the Insanity Defense After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 28 ME. L. REV. 435, 453
(1976). The states are evenly divided between the two viewpoints. For a guide
to the position of each state on the issue of whether insanity is an essential ele-
ment of a crime, see 17 A.L.R.3d 146, 158-59, 195-96 (1968).
111. It is'generally conceded that if the court realizes that the prosecutor
has not established an essential element of the prosecutor's case, even if the
defendant refuses to argue the issue, the court should direct a verdict or, at the
very least, appoint an amicus counsel to argue the issue for the defendant so
that the issue is presented to the jury. See Callahan v. LeFevre, 605 F.2d 70, 74
(2d Cir. 1979). This rigorous interpretation appears to be a potentially disposi-
tive threshhold question on the issue of whether to impose the insanity de-
fense over a defendant's objections. If technical, legal principles require the
imposition of the insanity defense whenever there is a substantial question of
the defendant's sanity-in effect, the Wright approach-a balancing of policy
interests is unnecessary.
112. For example, those who engage in extrahazardous occupations and ac-
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the Supreme Court has recognized that moral blame is not a
constitutional prerequisite to a conviction for a criminal of-
fense, or for punishment." 3
The current structure of the legal system also demon-
strates that moral blameworthiness is not, in any meaningful
way, an essential element of a crime. Although proponents of
the "element" interpretation might argue that moral blamewor-
thiness-evidenced by sanity-is a necessary component of the
crime's "intent" or mens rea requirement," 4 the Supreme
Court has never demanded that states accept this interpreta-
tion." 5 Moreover, the interpretation, if correct, would not ex-
plain the need for the insanity plea, since the defendant's
sanity could be debated and decided within the general deter-
mination of intent." 6 In addition, under this interpretation bi-
furcated trials would serve no useful purpose, since the sanity
element would have been litigated in the first phase of the
trial.117 Arguably, an investigation into mens rea assumes a re-
sponsible person and asks whether that person acted without
guilty intent, while an investigation into insanity inquires
whether the defendant was a responsible person in the first
place." 8 These considerations have led a number of courts to
adopt the Frendak approach even though they technically con-
sider sanity-or moral blameworthiness-an element of the
crime." 9
tivities are often held strictly liable. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v.
Cudd, 176 F.2d 855, 860 (10th Cir. 1949) (dictum). Strict liability also extends to
those who sell unreasonably dangerous or defective consumer products. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
113. See note 89 supra.
114. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 21 Md. App. 666, 671, 321 A.2d 170, 173 (1974).
115. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the Court noted that it would
not interfere with Oregon's policy of forcing the defendant to establish his or
her insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, because it could not "say [that] that
policy violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice." Id. at
799.
116. See Note, Mens Rea and Insanity, 28 ME. L. REV. 500, 509 (1976) ("If le-
gal insanity is no more than an incapacity to possess the 'guilty mind' required
for crime, then there is no reason to plead it as a special defense to criminalliability.").
117. For a discussion of the bifurcated format and its application by some
courts, see note 23 supra.
118. See H. FINGARETrE, supra note 106, at 128-34. But see J. HALT, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRmINAL LAw 449 (2d ed. 1960). See generally Note, supra note
116.
119. Compare People v. Kelly, 302 N.Y. 512, 515, 99 N.E.2d 552, 552 (1951)
(burden is on the state to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt) and State
v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 334, 529 P.2d 231, 233 (1974) (burden is on the state to
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt) with People v. Gonzalez, 20 N.Y.2d
289, 294, 229 N.E.2d 220, 223, 282 N.Y.S.2d 538, 542 (1967) (defer to a defendant's
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Even assuming that courts should avoid denigrating the
moral blameworthiness notion, it seems unlikely that a court's
refusal to impose the insanity defense over a defendant's objec-
tions, as in Frendak, would have more than a marginal impact
upon the vitality of that notion.1 20 A Frendak approach does
not eliminate that concept of moral responsibility, since de-
fendants may still argue the insanity defense at their option.
Ultimately, the Frendak analysis expands defendants' freedom
by insuring defendants the availability of the insanity defense
and yet allowing them to refuse the defense when they wish to
protect other interests.
Joseph Goldstein and Jay Katz suggest that this first socie-
tal interest in absolving the morally blameless of criminal re-
sponsibility is merely a screen behind which society hides a
second and more tangible goal-the hospitalization and control
of the criminally insane for the safety of society at large.121 Ar-
guably, the Wright approach identifies potentially violently in-
sane defendants and imposes the insanity defense over their
objection. If the jury acquits a defendant on the ground of in-
sanity, the court will likely commit the defendant to a mental
hospital, either by means of an automatic commitment stat-
ute, 122 or by civil commitment proceedings.123 The hospital will
voluntary and intelligent rejection of the plea), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 971 (1968)
and State v. Johnson, 116 Ariz. App. 561, 563, 570 P.2d 503, 505 (1977) (defer to a
defendant's voluntary and intelligent rejection of the plea).
120. It is doubtful that granting this one concession to defendants erodes
the strength of the insanity defense. The defense has long been part of the
American legal system. See note 106 supra. If the insanity defense were to be
eliminated, it would likely be because of mounting social pressure against its
use, see note 90 supra, not because of a procedural adjustment in a court's duty
to impose the defense.
121. Goldstein and Katz, supra note 90, at 864-68. These commentators as-
sert that this second concern is the result of "largely unconscious feelings of
apprehension, awe, and anger toward the 'sick,' particularly if associated with
'criminality'.. . ." Id. at 868. Several courts and statutes have called for the
hospitalization of the insane on the gound of reducing the insane defendant's
danger to society. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C.
Cir. 1957) ("the community's security may be better protected by hospitaliza-
tion ... than by imprisonment); People v. Hurt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 974, 977, 153
Cal. Rptr. 755, 757 (1979) (primary purpose for committing a defendant under
the statute is the protection of the public).
122. Ten states have statutes that automatically commit a defendant upon
acquittal on an insanity defense. See CoLO. REv. Stat. § 16-8-105(4) (1978); GA.
CODE ANN., § 27-1503(a) (1978) (separate sanity inquiry; prosecutor must show
good cause); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 103
(1980); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 123 § 16(a) (Michie/Law Co-op 1972); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 330.2050(1) (1980); MiNN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02(8) (1979) (civil commit-
ment proceedings to be instituted); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 175.521 (1979); Wis. STAT. § 971.17 (1977). In Minnesota, for example, the
legislature incorporated by statute the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure
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presumably not release the defendant into society until the de-
fendant's disturbance has been treated and his or her danger-
ousness curtailed.
This second societal interest is also a weak justification for
the adoption of the Wright approach. The assumption that a
court applying the Wright test can adequately identify poten-
tially dangerous defendants is inaccurate. Empirical evidence,
such as the well-known study conducted upon the release of
mental patients following Baxstrom v. Herold,124 has consist-
ently indicated that courts tend to overpredict dangerous-
ness. 125 This inability to identify dangerous individuals has led
courts not only to hospitalize defendants who should not have
been committed, but to release those who, upon being freed,
have engaged in further violent behavior.126 Moreover, the
and their injunction to continue civil commitment upon acquittal. If the de-
fendant is not under civil commitment, the court must initiate civil commit-
ment proceedings against the defendant and detain him or her in a state
hospital until they are completed. MiNN. R. Crim. P. 20.02(8)(1) (1979). The
District of Columbia also has an automatic commitment statute, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 24.301(d) (1973). The Supreme Court ruled, however, that a court could
not apply the statute to defendants on whom it imposed the defense. Lynch v.
Overholser, 369 U.S. at 719; see Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193, 196 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Cameron v. Fisher, 320 F.2d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
123. All states have a civil commitment statute authorizing courts to com-
mit those deemed insane following hearings and psychiatric examinations of
the prospective patient. See, e.g., MNN. STAT. § 253A (1980). Courts normally
resort to civil commitment proceedings if their state does not have an auto-
matic commitment statute. See, e.g., Allen v. Radack, 426 F. Supp. 1052, 1059
(D.S.D. 1977) (state must either initiate civil commitment proceedings or re-
lease individual acquitted of murder charge by reason of insanity); Novosel v.
Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 384 A.2d 124 (1978) (grand jury cannot certify defend-
ant as insane; state must indict or release defendant within thirty days).
Therefore, courts will commit virtually all defendants acquitted by reason of in-
sanity. Invariably, evidence of the defendant's criminal act is admissible at the
civil commitment hearing.
124. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). Baxstrom caused 969 prisoner patients in New
York state, who had been thought to be too dangerous for civil hospitals, to be
transferred to civil hospitals. Of 246 included in a survey, 232 of whom could be
located 41/2 years later, 65 had been released and were "being maintained" in
the community (in after-care clinics, etc.), only 9 had been convicted of a crime,
and only 5 had been transferred back to a facility for the criminally insane. The
remainder were residing in civil hospitals. Steadman & Keveles, The Commu-
nity Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129
Am. J. PsYCmATRY 304, 305, 310 (1972).
125. See Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1085
(1976); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 711-16 (1974); Kittrie, The Predic-
tion of Dangerousness: The Experts, the Courts, and the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, in MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINAL JusTIcE SYSTEM 43, 46 (N.
Beran & B. Toomey eds. 1979).
126. See Zitrin, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients, 133 AM. J. Psy-
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Frendak approach can arguably protect society as well as the
Wright approach through use of civil commitment proceedings
instituted at the time of the defendant's release from prison if
the released prisoner is considered dangerous.127 This interest
can, therefore, be achieved without an intrusion upon the de-
fendant's interests.12 8
A third societal interest that the Wright approach promotes
is the maintenance of order within prisons.129 Under the as-
sumption that mental hospitals, unlike prisons, have the exper-
tise and facilities to cope with the violently insane, a court
employing the Wright analysis will send potentially disruptive
defendants to mental hospitals. The goal of maintaining order
within prisons does not, however, justify the imposition of the
insanity defense upon a defendant; the Frendak approach
should not contribute to prison disorder. Under the Frendak
approach only a defendant with some degree of rationality can
reject the insanity defense. This approach thus gives some as-
surance that such a defendant will be able to function normally
in prison. In any event, prison officials have numerous means
to control disruptive inmates, 130 including the use of common
statutory procedures to transfer prisoners to mental hospi-
tals.131
cmATRY 142, 147-48 (1976) (arrest rates for assault, burglary, and rape were
higher for ex-mental patients than for the general community).
127. For civil commitment, most states require that prospective patients be
dangerous to themselves or others. See Note, supra note 95, at 1202-07. Simi-
larly, most civil commitment statutes require a patient's hospitalization until
his or her dangerousness has been eliminated. See Peszke, Is Dangerousness
an Issue for Physicians in Emergency Commitment?, 132 Am. J. PSYcIATRY 825,
826 (1975).
128. Of course, the inability to predict accurately dangerousness limits the
effectiveness of civil commitment proceedings under the Frendak approach to
the same extent that it limits the effectiveness of hospitalization under the
Wright approach.
129. See Sullivan v. Ford, 609 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
969 (1980).
130. "The possibility that a mentally disturbed prisoner may harm his fel-
low inmates is substantially minimized by prison security." Note, Transfer of
Prisoners to Mental Institutions, 69 J. CRns. L. & CRImINOLOGY 337, 346 (1978).
131. Most states have such transfer statutes. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-
302 (1973); MiNN. STAT. § 241.07 (1980). Federal prison officials can employ a
similar statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1976). For decisions employing this fed-
eral statute, see, e.g., Williams v. United States, 312 F.2d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir.
1962); Carter v. United States, 283 F.2d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Rosheisen v.
Steele, 193 F.2d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1951).
One might object that prison officials could use a transfer statute to imple-
ment the Wright approach absent the safeguards of a criminal trial. The
Supreme Court recently held, however, that procedural due process protections
apply to transfers of convicts from prison to mental health facilities. Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (right to a hearing, right to an independent deci-
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A fourth interest arguably fostered by the Wright approach
is the hybrid interest of the defendant and society in achieving
the most satisfactory disposition for the defendant. The gov-
ernment has long used its parens patriae power to act in a citi-
zen's best interest when that citizen fails to aid himself or
herself.132 In promoting this interest, a court following the
Wright approach would impose the insanity defense over the
defendant's objections when it believed the defendant had
erred in his or her assessment of self-interest.133 To the extent
that the court's assessment is correct, the Wright approach pro-
tects the defendant better than the Frendak approach.
By minimizing the number of "bad" decisions made by de-
fendants, the promotion of better dispositions for defendants
also furthers the integrity and legitimacy of the system as a
whole. Just as "the integrity of and public confidence in the
system are undermined when an easy conviction is obtained
due to the defendant's ill-advised decision to waive counsel,"' 34
a similar loss of integrity and confidence occurs when a defend-
ant makes an ill-advised decision to reject the insanity defense.
A Wright approach attempts to minimize such "bad" decisions
by taking them away from the defendant.
Underlying this hybrid interest is the assumption that the
state, rather than the defendant, can most accurately identify
the plea that best serves the defendant's interests. The validity
of this assumption, however, is tenuous. If one assumes that
the psychological model' 35 underlying Frendak is valid, even a
"mentally ill" defendant can possibly make informed, rational
sionmaker, and limited right to call witnesses). This decision ensures that
prison officials cannot arbitrarily use the transfer device to circumvent
Frendak.
132. The Supreme Court has long recognized a state's parens patriae power
in cases where the state acts for defendants who cannot act in their own best
interests. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 839-40 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1972) (dic-
tum). In the context of their mentally disturbed citizens, states invoke their
parens patriae authority by civilly committing those in need of treatment. See
N. FuNKEL, supra note 26, at 30-32; Note, Constitutional Standards for Release of
the Civilly Committed and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Strict Scrutiny
Analysis, 20 A~iz. L. REv. 233, 240 (1978).
133. For example, a court might believe that the defendant would benefit
more from psychiatric therapy in a mental hospital than he or she would from a
prison sentence. Also, the court might favor commitment on the ground that if
the defendant pleads not guilty and is acquitted and freed, the defendant may
be unable to care for his or her own basic needs; alternatively, if the defendant
is found guilty, he or she will stand convicted of a crime, instead of being tech-
nically acquitted.
134. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
135. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
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decisions concerning the conduct of his or her defense.136 In
addition, since the Wright approach emphasizes the treatment
or rehabilitation of the defendant and thus focuses only upon
whether there is a "sufficient question" of the defendant's san-
ity, it ignores the substantial reasons 137 for a defendant to re-
ject the insanity defense. Ultimately, the Wright approach does
not even inquire into the possible efficacy of hospitalization138
or the possibly harmful effects of incarceration. It seems im-
proper that the state should be able to "interfere with individ-
ual autonomy ... without any assurance that the state, as a
substitute decisionmaker, would better ascertain the best inter-
est of the individual."139
Even assuming that the judicial system is more capable of
acquiring information and making decisions than is a given de-
fendant, it is questionable whether such superiority justifies
the Wright approach's untrammeled intrusion upon the defend-
ant's autonomy. The beneficial effect of "good" decisions on the
legitimacy of the legal system must be balanced against the
harmful effect of restricting the freedom of choice of defend-
ants. The Supreme Court, in deciding whether to wrest deci-
sions from defendants in criminal matters, has never required
that a defendant be capable of making the best decision.140
Rather, the Court has required, as in Alford and Faretta, only
that the defendant be able to make a voluntary and intelligent
decision.14' The Frendak approach guarantees the defendant's
136. Many of those civilly committed are capable of making rational choices
concerning treatment. See J. PAGE, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 32-36 (1971); Dersho-
witz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRiAL 29,
32 (Feb.-Mar. 1968); Plotkin, supra note 100, at 489 ("the psychiatric literature is
unanimous in the conclusion that there is not necessarily any relationship be-
tween hospitalization and the ability to make rational decisions") (footnote
omitted); Siegel, The Justifications for Medical Commitment-Real or Illusory,
16 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 21, 31-33 (1969); note 74 supra and accompany-
ing text.
137. See notes 93-99 supra and accompanying text.
138. For some mentally ill patients, no amount of psychiatric care will effect
a cure. Moreover, some psychiatric therapy can be ineffective if the patient is
unwilling to receive treatment. See note 143 infra.
139. Note, supra note 95, at 1213.
140. For example, in Faretta, the Court refused to overturn the defendant's
decision to represent himself, even though that the decision may have resulted
in an inadequate performance at trial. See notes 35-36 supra and accompany-
ing text.
141. The quantity of information required by the Supreme Court for an ac-
ceptably "intelligent" choice is typically small. A defendant need only be "ad-
vised by competent counsel" and know "the nature of the charge;" an accused
need not "correctly assess every relevant factor" of the case. Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970).
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opportunity to make this decision.142
A fifth societal interest that the Wright approach arguably
promotes is the defendant's expeditious return to society as a
productive member. By imposing the insanity defense, a court
following Wright arguably ensures that an insane defendant
will receive psychiatric treatment designed to cure his or her
illness. Since a mental hospital can release the defendant im-
mediately following such a cure, the defendant can quickly re-
turn to society as a productive member.
This societal interest rests on three untenable assump-
tions, however, and is thus difficult to accept as a justification
for imposing the insanity defense over a defendant's objections.
The first assumption is that an individual incarcerated under
Frendak must serve a long prison sentence. Such defendants,
however, may have faced a misdemeanor charge and a rela-
tively light penalty, or may be eligible for parole while serving
a lengthy sentence. The second incorrect assumption is that
psychiatric treatment is effective even when the patient does
not desire such care,143 as may be the case when a defendant
has rejected the insanity defense. The final assumption is that
hospitals immediately release patients who are cured. Al-
though the fairly strict release procedures' 44 used by some
142. See text accompanying notes 158-159 infra.
143. See J. RAPPAPORTr COMMuNIY PSYCHOLOGY 322 (1977) ("[I]f the aim is
treatment, in the sense of preparing for a useful role in society, then it will be
necessary for treatment to be voluntary rather than forced .... "). The failure
of treatment in the face of patient opposition is especially pronounced in psy-
chotherapy, see N. MoRms, THE FUTURE OF IMPRisoNmENT 5-6 (1974); Katz, The
Right to Treatment--An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. I REv. 755, 776-
77 (1969), and behavior modification therapy, see E. ERWIN, BEHAVIOR THERAPY
180-81 (1978); Marks, The Current Status of Behavioral Psychotherapy: Theory
and Practice, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 253, 255 (1976).
In some cases, not even the best psychiatric care can cure the mental ill-
ness of a defendant who desires treatment. See Liss & Franes, Court Mandated
Treatment: Dilemmas for Hospital Psychiatry, 132 Am. J. PSYCHiATRY 924, 926
(1975); Twersld, Treating the Untreatable: A Critique of the Proposed Right to
Treatment Law, 22 Hosp. & ComMuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 261, 262 (1971). The lack of
an effective cure in all cases is not an argument for choosing imprisonment
over hospitalization for someone clearly insane, but it weakens the fifth justifi-
cation for choosing hospitalization in a case involving someone only questiona-
bly insane.
144. Many patients are discharged "relatively quickly as the result of infor-
mal administrative action taken by hospital authorities." Note, supra note 95,
at 1377 (footnote omitted). See R. RocK, M. JACOBSON, & R. JANOPAUL, Hospi-
TALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 214 (1968). Nine states limit
involuntary commitments to determinate periods and, therefore, require re-
lease or recommitment at fixed intervals. See CAL. WE.LF. & INST. CODE § 5304
(West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-
506.2 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 2334, 2374 (1978); MASS. GEN.
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mental hospitals help ensure that mental patients are released
upon their rehabilitation, many patients, particularly those ad-
judged not guilty by reason of insanity, are held long after their
dangerousness has passed.145
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The above analysis suggests that the Frendak approach is
superior to the Wright approach in its ability to achieve both
the defendant's interests and the significant interests of soci-
ety. As noted above, 46 the Frendak approach's "voluntary and
intelligent" requirement focuses on whether the defendant's
decision in regard to the insanity plea is freely given, reason-
ably well-informed, and indicative of a rational capacity to
weigh alternatives. These elements must, however, be made
more specific before courts can successfully apply the Frendak
approach.
In evaluating the voluntariness'47 of a defendant's plea, a
trial court must first ascertain whether the plea was illegally
coerced by the prosecutor.14 Such illegal coercion occurs
LAwS ANN. ch. 123, §§ 4, 8 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 135-B:38 (1978); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 9.33 (McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122-58.8 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.320 (Supp. 1981).
145. Commentators have noted that those acquitted by reason of insanity
"are hospitalized for far longer periods than other civil patients, the duration
more likely to be related to the seriousness of the criminal act, than to the pa-
tient's improvement." German & Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitaliza-
tion of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1037
(1976) (footnote omitted). June German and Anne Singer cite, as one fault of
release procedures for the acquitted, the procedural difficulties that "usually
ensnare the patient in such a quagmire that release is unduly delayed and
sometimes prevented altogether." Id. at 1054.
Courts sometimes refuse to allow the release of one who has been commit-
ted due to a successful plea of insanity despite overwhelming evidence of the
patient's return to health. See, e.g., State v. Montague, 510 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974) (unanimous psychiatric testimony that patient is free from psycho-
sis); Hefley v. State, 480 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1972) (testimony of three
psychiatrists that patient is cured). At least one court has recognized that
"once a patient has remained in a large mental hospital for two years or more,
he is quite unlikely to leave except by death. He becomes one of the large
mass of so-caller [sic] 'chronic' patients." United States ex rel. Schuster v. He-
rold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1079 (2d Cir.) (quoting Bloomberg, A Proposal for a Commu-
nity-based Hospital as a Branch of a State Hospital, 116 Am. J. PsYCHIATRY 814
(1960), cited in J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN, & A. DERSHOWrrz, PSYCHOANALYSIS, Psy-
CHsATRY AND LAw 664 (1967)), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969).
146. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
147. Although neither Frendak nor Wright specifically addressed the volun-
tariness issue, the Wright court contended that voluntariness was considered
in its test and asserted that a defendant's insanity could make his or her plea
involuntary. See note 52 supra.
148. Perhaps the most common source of prosecutorial coercion in the crim-
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when, for example, the prosecutor threatens to bring an un-
founded charge if the defendant asserts that he or she will
raise the insanity defense.149 Standards used to identify illegal
prosecutorial coercion in the context of the guilty plea150 can be
adopted to aid courts in identifying prosecutorial misdeeds in
the context of the insanity plea, but courts should recognize
that the level of coercion acceptable in the context of the sane
defendant may be greater than that in the context of the ques-
tionably sane defendant.151
Although a trial court should revert to the Wright approach
if it finds that the defendant's plea decision does not meet
Frendak's "voluntary and intelligent" requirement, 5 2
Frendak's goal of deference to the defendant's interests re-
quires that the -court attempt to eliminate illegal prosecutorial
coercion before resorting to the Wright approach. If the court
finds illegal coercion and can issue the necessary orders to re-
strain the prosecution 53 it should do so and allow the defend-
ant to make a voluntary choice. If the illegal coercion cannot
readily be eliminated, the court ought to impose the insanity
defense and force the prosecution to prove the defendant's san-
ity.154
inal context is the plea bargaining process, though courts rarely hold that it has
risen to an unacceptable level. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
364-65 (1978). For an excellent discussion of coercion and its limits in the con-
text of plea bargaining and sentencing, see generally Nemerson, Coercive Sen-
tencing, 64 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1980). For general theoretical discussions of the
concept of coercion and its pervasiveness in society, see generally COERCION,
[1972] Y.B. AM. SOC'Y FOR POL & LEGAL RIGHTS; Feierabend, Nesvold & Feier-
abend, Political Coerciveness and Turmoil, a Cross-National Inquiry, 5 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 93 (1970).
149. A prosecutor might also illegally coerce the defendant by promising to
discontinue improper harassment if the defendant rejects the insanity plea.
150. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
223 (1927).
151. The Wright court explicitly suggested that a defendant's mental illness
might, in a sense, "coerce" him or her into rejecting the insanity defense. See
627 F.2d at 1311-12. Moreover, the defendant's mental condition has been held
relevant in determining the legality of coercive pressures in other contexts, as
where a court determines whether a will is invalid due to undue influence. See
generally 94 C.J.S. Wills § 233 (1956).
152. See note 25 supra.
153. An appellate court, of course, does not have the ability of a trial court
to address the coercion directly. Thus, if an appellate court discovers coercion
at the trial court level, it cannot issue injunctions to prevent what has hap-
pened. Instead, the court must reverse the judgment and vacate the plea. See,
e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1968).
154. In a sense, forcing a defendant to proceed to trial in an effort to prevent
coercion seems illogical-in effect, the state is restricting the defendant's
choice by not allowing the defendant to pursue his or her preferred, albeit co-
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A court following the Frendak approach must also ensure
that the defendant has sufficient information to make an intelli-
gent decision. 5 5 The court should advise the defendant of the
nature of the charges brought against him or her, the implica-
tions of the various sentences that he or she faces, and the en-
vironment and treatment provided in both the mental hospital
and the prison. 5 6 Typically, the court determines the extent of
the defendant's knowledge by conducting a colloquy with the
defendant.157
Finally, the court must ensure that the defendant has the
capacity to weigh the alternatives and to choose the one that is
in his or her best interest. Initially, the trial court must ascer-
tain whether the defendant has understood the information he
or she has received. The court can do this by questioning the
defendant as to his or her motives for rejecting the insanity de-
fense, and by determining whether these motives correspond to
the facts. To the extent that the court is unable to make this
determination alone, the court can consult psychiatrists for ex-
pert opinions. 58 In addition, the court must ensure that the de-
fendant's mental illness does not compel the defendant to
reject the insanity defense. In a difficult case in which the line
between a rational motive and mental illness is slight,159 psy-
chiatrists can help the court distinguish between the two. 60
One indication of an unacceptable compulsion might be the de-
fendant's refusal to plead insanity despite the existence of an
obvious reason for making such a plea-for example, the virtual
certainty that the defendant will be convicted of a capital crime
if he or she does not raise the defense.
If the defendant satisfies the elements of this detailed
erced, alternative. Such a tactic might, however, force the state to reconsider
its case and perhaps renegotiate a plea more favorable to the defendant. Also,
a defendant who is forced to proceed to trial will, if convicted, have both stand-
ing and increased incentive to complain of the illegality of the coercion. Of
course, this approach will force some defendants to bear the responsibility for
preventing coercion.
155. See note 141 supra.
156. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970).
157. See United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
158. Psychiatrists are competent to "make a judgment that the severity of
mental illness has impaired a patient's competence to make an informed deci-
sion as to the risks involved in not obtaining treatment." Peszke, supra note
127, at 828.
159. For example, the difference between a religious fanatic and a mentally
ill person is often slight. See United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d at 1304 n.22.
160. Psychiatrists, for example, should be capable of recognizing when a de-
fendant's refusal to plead insanity stems from his or her inability to recognize
that he or she is mentally ill. See Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d at 380.
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Frendak approach, he or she should be allowed to reject the in-
sanity defense.1 6l If the defendant fails to satisfy the elements,
the court should revert to the Wright approach.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over the relative merits of the Frendak and
Wright approaches must eventually focus on the policy consid-
erations enumerated above. Detailed analysis reveals that de-
fendants have significant interests in deciding whether to
refuse to plead insanity. Although society has corresponding
interests in imposing the plea over the defendants' objections,
the Wright approach does not serve all of these interests, and
those that it does serve can be addressed adequately by the
Frendak "voluntary and intelligent" approach. A detailed
Frendak approach--one that guides courts in detecting a truly
voluntary and intelligent rejection of the insanity defense-is
thus the superior alternative.
161. Anne Singer agrees that the Wright test is inadequate, but does not
prefer an unaltered Frendak approach. Instead, she recommends that a court
adopt a four-step approach. The court
should hold a hearing on (1) whether the defendant really does have a
strong insanity defense; (2) if so, whether the defendant's waiver of the
defense is a knowing and voluntary one; (3) if not, whether he should
not be tried until he gains the ability to knowingly and intelligently de-
cide the issue of his defense; and (4) if not, whether, using the substi-
tuted judgment test the court should interpose the defense for him.
Singer, supra note 4, at 663.
Assuming that Singer's requirement that the insanity defense be "strong"
is identical to the Wright court's requirement that the defense be "sufficient,"
the first two steps of Singer's approach and the Frendak approach are identical
in their primary effect: neither test imposes the defense upon a defendant who
makes a voluntary and intelligent decision, regardless of whether the insanity
defense is strong or weak. While the Frendak approach imposes the plea given
a nonvoluntary and intelligent decision and a sufficiently strong defense, how-
ever, the Singer proposal demands two more prerequisites. First, the defend-
ant must be unable to return to competence within a reasonable time. Id. at
659. Second, the trial court must use a "substituted judgment test," and make
the decision "it believes [the defendant] would make if he could." Id.
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